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11 Introduction and Motivation
Latin America has been known for its high economic inequality and poor
macroeconomic performance, and also for a particular propensity to ￿ irt be-
tween political dictatorships and more democratic institutions. For instance,
in the 1980s, after a spell of dictatorships, a number of Latin American
countries re-democratised (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, to mention
a few). However, almost immediately after this process of political liberalisa-
tion had taken place, high in￿ ation and even severe bursts of hyperin￿ ation
also happened in those countries. Macroeconomic stabilisation took some
time to take root in the region. In fact, stabilisation came only after a
considerable ten-year delay in the 1990s.
With data for Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Bolivia from 1970 to 2007,
periods of political dictatorship, re-democratisation, high in￿ ation, hyper-
in￿ ation, and then ￿nally macroeconomic stabilisation are captured. We
test for the populist view of in￿ ation in Latin America, which predicts that
in countries with high economic inequality that re-democratise, the coali-
tion coming into power will try to [re]distribute income from the rich to
the poor. However, this is usually done through higher and unfunded public
de￿cits, or wage and salary increases, which in turn generate higher in￿ ation
and macroeconomic instability, and this is known to be detrimental to the
welfare of the poor1.
The empirical results suggest that during the period of political dic-
tatorship in￿ ation was lower, which indicates that the implementation of
democracy seen in the 1980s was, in fact, detrimental to macroeconomic
stability. Therefore, the evidence allows us to speculate that the recently
elected governments in those countries pursued populist, or the so-called
[re]distributive, policies that eventually led to poor macroeconomic perfor-
mance through very high rates of in￿ ation and even hyperin￿ ation.
The contribution of this paper is that, ￿rstly, we focus on understand-
ing the hyperin￿ ationary bursts in Latin American countries right after
re-democratisation. This entails a disaggregation of the data to pinpoint
1For instance, Bittencourt (2009) investigates the case of the Brazilian hyperin￿ ation
of the 1980s and 1990s, and he suggests that the high rates of in￿ ation seen at the time
contributed to inequality. Moreover, Easterly and Fischer (2001) suggest that the poor
from 38 countries consider in￿ ation to be a more pressing problem than the rich, which
suggests that the poor are the ones su⁄ering more with higher in￿ ation.
2more accurately the impact of democracy on hyperin￿ ation. Secondly, we
construct a political index based on principal components analysis, which
extracts the common factors of di⁄erent political regime variables, and
that gives a proxy for political regime characteristics with more explana-
tory power. Thirdly, we make use of the relatively novel panel time-series
analysis that deals with interesting empirical issues such as non-stationarity,
heterogeneity bias in dynamic panels, economic endogeneity and between-
country dependence, issues not covered by the previous studies, and which
are therefore believed to improve on previous estimates.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: the next subsection brie￿ y
reviews and inserts this paper within the previous literature. Section 2
describes the data and the empirical strategy used, and then reports and
discusses the results. Section 3 concludes; it summarises the work, and
suggests some policy implications and also future work.
1.1 Related Literature
Paldam (1987) presents some early evidence, which does not take into ac-
count the hyperin￿ ationary bursts of the 1990s, that suggests that civilian
governments tend to generate higher in￿ ation than military ones in Latin
America; and Sachs (1989), and Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) descrip-
tively highlight the issue of recently elected governments pursuing redistrib-
utive populist policies in Latin America in the 1980s.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) suggest that in more ￿ polarised￿societies, or in
societies with higher income inequality, stabilisations are delayed, (i.e. sta-
bilisations come only after some ￿ political consolidation￿takes place, or after
an agreement on which group pays for the stabilisation is reached). This is
important for the Latin American case, not only because it presents high in-
come inequality, but also because, roughly speaking, stabilisation came only
after a ten-year delay following the implementation of democracy. Alter-
natively, Cukierman et al. (1992) suggest that more homogeneous societies
rely less on seigniorage, and Veiga (2000) provides evidence that in more
fragmented societies, or societies with a large number of political parties in
congress, stabilisations are delayed. The latter is also related to the Latin
American experience right after re-democratisation in which the number of
political parties was by far higher than ten years after re-democratisation,
which suggests that political fragmentation has been reduced over time, or
3alternatively, that a process of political consolidation with less, but more
structured political coalitions, have been taking place in the region.
Moreover, Beetsma and Van der Ploeg (1996) argue that in excessively
unequal societies, and Latin America ￿ts the bill again, the government
tries to please the median voter, or the poor in this case, via redistribution2.
Desai, et al. (2003) suggest that it all depends on how unequal a country
is (i.e. democratisation taking place in unequal countries lead to populist
policies and hence high in￿ ation, which is the case in some Latin American
countries). Furthermore, Desai et al. (2005), suggest that inequality a⁄ects
in￿ ation, but conditional on the political structure3.
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003) suggest that dis-
tortionary macroeconomic policies that retard economic growth (e.g. in
terms of high in￿ ation), are symptoms of ￿ weak institutions￿ , or not prop-
erly constrained executives. Furthermore, Acemoglu, Johnson and Querub￿n
(2008) suggest that policy reforms are only successful when the ￿ political
context￿is right (e.g. Zimbabwe implemented central bank independence
in 1995, however it has been plagued with hyperin￿ ation since 1999 when
the constraints on the executive were severely curtailed). Finally, Dutt and
Mitra (2008) suggest that excessive inequality leads to political instability,
which in turn leads to policy volatility, and therefore lower investment and
economic growth.
All in all, the literature suggests that the implementation of democracy
in developing countries should be accompanied not only by the ￿ right polit-
ical context￿ , or well-constrained executives, but also by the right economic
institutions (e.g. sound ￿scal and monetary policies conducted by a respon-
sible and independent treasury and central bank respectively). All the same,
the ￿ right political context￿and the right economic institutions should move
together in this context, so that the costs of delayed stabilisations could be
somehow avoided.
This seems to be the case in Latin America (i.e. a re-democratisation
process in an unequal region without much political maturity, at least in
terms of number of political parties in Congress during and after democrati-
sation, and also without the necessary economic institutions in place￿ ￿scal
2In addition, Al-Marhubi (1997), suggests that higher inequality is positively associated
with higher in￿ ation rates in a cross-section of countries.
3Also, Aisen and Veiga (2006) suggest that political instability, exempli￿ed by the
number of government crisis, leads to higher in￿ ation, in particular in developing countries.
4rules and central-bank independence came only towards the end of the
1990s￿ resulted in a long spell of macroeconomic instability in the region,
with all its costs to economic welfare)4.
2 Data, Empirical Strategy, and Results
The data set used covers the period between 1970 and 2007, and four Latin
American countries, namely Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Bolivia (i.e. T = 37
and N = 4). The data on in￿ ation (INFLAT) come from the Bureaux of
Census of the four countries. The normalised political variables that we
use come from the Polity IV data set, which is compiled and provided by
the Centre for Global Policy, and they are: democracy (DEMOC), which
ranges from 0 (a more democratic country) to 1 (a less democratic one);
constraints on the executive (XCONST), which ranges from 0 (a more con-
strained executive) to 1 (a less constrained one); and political competition
(POLCOMP), which ranges from 0 (more political competition) to 1 (less
political competition).
With the above information we can, via spectral decomposition, use
principal components analysis to extract the common factors, or the lin-
ear combinations, of these three normalised Polity IV variables, so that we
end up with a proxy for political regime characteristics (POLITY ) which
contributes to reduce omitted variable problems, or model uncertainty, and
which presents more explanatory power. This is potentially important be-
cause in this case we are able to reduce the dimensionality of a set of prospec-
tive political variables, and we end up with one variable, POLITY , that
contains most of the information coming from di⁄erent candidates for polit-
ical regime characteristics.
The control variables used include the government￿ s share of the real
gross domestic product (GOV), the ratio of exports and imports over the real
gross domestic product (OPEN), the growth rate of the real gross domestic
product (GROWTH), and the liquid liabilities over the real gross domestic
product (M2), which are all provided by the Penn World Table (PWT) data
set mark 6.3 and World Development Indicators respectively.
Table One presents the correlation matrix, so that we can have an initial
4Alternatively, Crowe (2006) suggests that when democratisation takes place, the ￿ elite
bias￿is reduced and macroeconomic stabilisation takes place without much delay.
5insight on the behaviour of the data; and what can be seen initially is that
both political regime variables used, i.e. DEMOC and POLITY present
negative correlations with in￿ ation. This tentatively suggests that when
these countries re-democratised in the 1980s, or when the variables for po-
litical regime characteristics decreased in size, macroeconomic performance
deteriorated in terms of in￿ ation rates.
The control GOV presents the expected positive correlation with in￿ a-
tion, i.e. bigger governments tend to generate higher in￿ ation, and OPEN,
GROWTH and M2 present the expected negative signs against the in￿ ation
rates. This is because it is believed that more economically open societies,
and countries that grow faster and which possess a more developed ￿nancial
system tend to present a more stable macroeconomic environment.
Table 1: The Correlation Matrix: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, 1970-2007.
INFLAT GOV DEMOC POLITY OPEN GROWTH M2
INFLAT 1
GOV .333* 1
DEMOC -.150 .209* 1
POLITY -.142 .226* .995* 1
OPEN -.379* -.633* -.305* -.323* 1
GROWTH -.450* -.166* .100 .100 .043 1
M2 -.299* -.165* -.426* -.422* .368* .103 1
Sources: Bureaux of Census, Centre for Global Policy, Penn World Table, World
Development Indicators and author￿ s own calculations. * represents statistical signi￿cance
at the 5% level.
In addition, and for the sake of clarity, we plot the data on in￿ ation and
political regime characteristics in each country separately. Each panel of
Figure One illustrates the fact that when those countries re-democratised in
the 1980s, illustrated by a reduction in the indices of political regime charac-
teristics, the in￿ ation rates increased considerably shortly after. Moreover,
it is also seen that macroeconomic stabilisation took roughly ten years after
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Figure 1: In￿ ation and Political Regime, 1970-2007. Sources: Bureaux of Census, Polity
IV and author￿ s own calculations. Inflation is the in￿ ation rate and Polity is the
measure of political regime.
Therefore, this initial inspection of the data, with all its caveats, suggests
that the process of political liberalisation taking place in the 1980s was
followed by very high rates of in￿ ation in the region. Moreover, stabilisation
was clearly delayed, i.e. it came only well after the ￿rst civilian presidents
came into o¢ ce, with the implementation of certain stabilisation plans and
other economic institutions.
In terms of econometric modelling, since we have a T > N data set, the
empirical strategy used is based on panel time-series analysis. Firstly, for
non-stationarity in the country time-series we use the Im, Pesaran and Shin
[IPS (2003)] test, which allows for heterogeneous parameters and serial corre-
lation in the residuals. The IPS test consists of an augmented Dickey-Fuller
regression for each variable of each country, and these are then averaged.
The moments of the mean and variance of the average ￿ t are -1.46 and .63
7respectively5.
Secondly, the issue of heterogeneity bias in dynamic T > N panels, which
is caused because under wrongly assumed homogeneity of the slopes, the
composite disturbance term ends up being serially correlated and the ex-
planatory variables xs are not independent of the lagged dependent variable
yt￿1. This is dealt with by the Swamy￿ s (1970) Random Coe¢ cients (RC)
estimator, which gives consistent estimates of the expected values. The
RC estimator assumes the existence of heterogeneous intercepts and slopes,
and it consists of a weighted average of ￿i and of the ￿is. The weight
is a modi￿ed variance-covariance matrix of the heterogeneous parameters6.
Moreover, the one-way Fixed E⁄ects (FE) estimator also provides consistent
estimates in dynamic models when T ! 1, but only when the slopes are
homogeneous7.
All in all, these estimators account not only for important econometric
issues, but also for the fact that some of these countries present di⁄erent
levels of economic development because of particular idiosyncrasies (Brazil
and Argentina are known to be relatively more developed than Peru and
Bolivia).
Furthermore, some would argue that there is reverse causality present
(i.e. high rates of in￿ ation would actually determine regime change in the
region, or the democratic transition in this case). We therefore use the Fixed
E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables (FE-IV) two-stage Least Squares esti-
mator, with the ￿rst lag of the respective political regime variable as the
identifying instrument for the contemporaneous political variable being esti-
mated. The estimates provided by the FE-IV estimator are asymptotically
consistent and e¢ cient as T ! 1.
We therefore estimate static and dynamic models with di⁄erent pooled
estimators (i.e. the benchmark Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS),
Fixed E⁄ects (FE), Random Coe¢ cients (RC) and Fixed E⁄ects with In-
strumental Variables (FE-IV)). The estimated heterogeneous dynamic equa-
5An alternative to IPS (2003) is the test by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). However, this
test assumes parameter homogeneity, and therefore does not consider a possible hetero-
geneity bias present in the data.
6The Mean Group estimator, proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), is also an alter-
native. However, this estimator is sensitive to outliers, a problem not faced by the RC
estimator.
7In addition, GMM-type estimators are not an alternative under T > N for the over-
￿tting problem. See Bond (2002).
8tion is therefore as follows
INFLATit = ￿i + ￿iPOLITYit + ￿iGOVit + ￿iOPENit (1)
+￿iGROWTHit + ￿iM2it + "iINFLATit￿1 + ￿it;
in which INFLAT are the in￿ ation rates, POLITY is the political regime
variable which consists of the common factors of DEMOC, XCONST and
POLCOMP, GOV is the share of government in the gross domestic prod-
uct, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, GROWTH are the growth
rates of the gross domestic products, and M2 are the liquid liabilities, which
is a measure of ￿nancial development.
In addition, we deal with between-country dependence, which is believed
to happen through the disturbances being E(uitujt) 6= 0. For that we make
use of Zellner￿ s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) estimator,
which presents greater e¢ ciency, the greater the correlation amongst the
disturbances. The SUR estimates di⁄erent country time series, which are
then weighted by the covariance matrix of the disturbances8. Moreover, this
estimator provides rather insightful estimates because it disaggregates the
analysis even further than the pooled analysis, so that we can have a more
in-depth view of the hyperin￿ ationary processes at the time9. Equation Two
illustrates the equation estimated for each country,
INFLATt = ￿t + ￿POLITYt + ￿GOVt + ￿OPENt (2)
+￿GROWTHt + ￿M2t + ￿t:
In terms of results, ￿rstly, in Table Two we report the IPS statistics,
and they suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of unit roots and
accept in favour of the alternative that at least one country of each variable
is, in fact, stationary. This implies that no further data transformations are
needed, and also that cointegration analysis cannot be pursued.
8An alternative to SUR is the Common E⁄ects Estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006).
However, N is assumed to be large and in our data set N=4. Furthemore, Kapoor, M.,
H. H. Kelejian, et al. (2007) propose an estimator that also works best under the N ! 1
assumption.
9For a more thorough discussion about panel time-series analysis in general, see Smith
and Fuertes (2008).









The moments of the mean E and variance var of the average ﬂ t are respectively: -1.46
and .63. Source: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and author￿ s own calculations.
Secondly, in Table Three we report the static estimates of DEMOC
and POLITY on in￿ ation using the POLS and FE estimators respectively.
Columns One and Two make use of the DEMOC variable and it presents
negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation in both estimated
equations. The three control variables present the expected signs and are all
statistically signi￿cant (i.e. OPEN, GROWTH and M2 are all negatively
associated with the in￿ ation rates). The GOV estimates are positive, but
not statistically signi￿cant. The F test* suggests the presence of ￿xed e⁄ects,
which indicates that the FE estimator is the most appropriate one in this
static instance.
Columns Three and Four make use of the POLITY proxy for political
regime characteristics, and it also presents negative and statistically signi￿-
cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation in both equations. The three control variables follow
the same pattern as before (i.e. OPEN, GROWTH and M2 all present
negative e⁄ects on the in￿ ation rates). The GOV estimates are not clear
cut in this case either. The F test* con￿rms the presence of ￿xed e⁄ects,
which again makes the FE estimator the most appropriate to be used in this
static context.
10Table 3: Static Estimates of DEMOC and POLITY on In￿ ation, 1970-2007.
Static Models
INFLAT POLS (1) FE (2) POLS (3) FE (4)
GOV .029 (1.40) .003 (.12) -.030 (1.44) .002 (.09)
DEMOC -1.003 (-4.98) -1.137 (-5.53)
POLITY -.187 (-4.93) -.125 (-5.56)
OPEN -.017 (-3.43) -.040 (-3.29) -.018 (-3.48) -.041 (-3.35)
GROWTH -.074 (-5.53) -.067 (-4.90) -.074 (-5.52) -.067 (-4.91)
M2 -.020 (-3.95) -.016 (-2.44) -.020 (-3.89) -.016 (-2.45)
Constant 1.77 (3.66) 2.87 (3.77) 1.25 (2.68) 2.33 (3.12)
F test 23.64 24.56 23.51 24.67
F test* 2.76 3.00
R2 .44 .40 .44 .40
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 148: The basic esti-
mated equation is INFLATit = ￿ + ￿POLITYit + ￿GOVit + ￿OPENit +
￿GROWTHit +￿M2it +￿it; in which INFLAT is the in￿ ation rates, DEMOC
and POLITY are the political regime variables, GOV is the government￿ s share in the
real GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, GROWTH is the growth rates
of the real GDP, and M2 is a measure of ￿nancial development. POLS is the Pooled
Ordinary Least Squares and FE is the Fixed E⁄ects estimators.
Thirdly, in Table Four we report the dynamic estimates of DEMOC
and POLITY on in￿ ation using the FE and RC estimators respectively.
In Columns One and Two we use the variable DEMOC, and it presents
negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation. The three controls,
OPEN, GROWTH and M2, present mostly negative e⁄ects on in￿ ation,
however they are not all statistically signi￿cant. The control GOV presents
positive signs and the RC estimates are statistically signi￿cant. The Likeli-
hood Ratio (LR) test suggests heterogeneity of intercepts and slopes, which
indicates that the RC estimator is, in fact, the one delivering the best esti-
mates in this dynamic case.
In Columns Three and Four we make use of the POLITY proxy for
political regime characteristics, and it presents negative and statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation in both equations. The control GOV presents
the expected positive sign, and the RC estimates are statistically signi￿cant.
OPEN, GROWTH and M2 present mostly negative e⁄ects on in￿ ation,
11however they are not entirely signi￿cant. The LR test again suggests the
presence of heterogeneous intercepts and slopes, which makes the RC esti-
mator the best alternative in this context.
Table 4: Dynamic Estimates of DEMOC and POLITY on In￿ ation, 1970-2007.
Dynamic Models
INFLAT FE (1) RC (2) FE (3) RC (4)
GOV .004 (.19) .133 (3.33) .004 (.18) .132 (3.39)
DEMOC -.377 (-2.14) -.659 (-2.86)
POLITY -.070 (-2.13) -.118 (-2.90)
OPEN -.026 (-2.74) -.037 (-.62) -.026 (-2.75) -.037 (-.62)
GROWTH -.049 (-4.56) -.039 (-2.87) -.049 (-4.57) -.039 (-2.93)
M2 .001 (.33) .007 (-.24) .001 (.33) -.007 (-.23)
INFLAT(￿1) .584 (9.93) .432 (5.49) .583 (9.90) .436 (5.66)
Constant 1.20 (1.97) -1.20 (-1.66) 1.02 (1.73) -1.51 (-2.09)
F test 50.77 50.75
F test* 1.71 1.73
Wald test 227.60 231.82
LR test 61.53 61.55
R2 .64 .63
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 148: The basic esti-
mated equation is INFLATit = ￿i + ￿POLITYit + ￿GOVit + ￿OPENit +
￿GROWTHit+￿M2it+"INFLATit￿1+￿it; in which INFLAT is the in￿ ation
rates, DEMOC and POLITY are the political regime variables, GOV is the govern-
ment￿ s share in the real GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, GROWTH
is the growth rates of the real GDP, and M2 is a measure of ￿nancial development. FE
is the Fixed E⁄ects and RC the Random Coe¢ cients estimators.
In Table Five we report the estimates of DEMOC and POLITY on
in￿ ation using the FE-IV estimator. In columns one and two we regress
DEMOC against in￿ ation in static and dynamic speci￿cations, and it presents
negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation. The controls OPEN,
GROWTH and M2 present negative e⁄ects and are mostly signi￿cant.
GOV presents positive e⁄ects, however the estimates are not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. Furthermore, the instruments are signi￿cant in the ￿rst-
stage regressions and the F* tests indicate the presence of ￿xed e⁄ects.
12In columns three and four we regress the proxy POLITY against in-
￿ ation. POLITY keeps its signi￿cant negative e⁄ects on in￿ ation. The
controls OPEN, GROWTH and M2 are mostly negative and signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. The GOV estimates are positive, however not statisti-
cally signi￿cant. Moreover, the instruments are signi￿cant in the ￿rst-stage
regressions and the F* test indicates ￿xed e⁄ects.
Table Five: Second-Stage Estimates of DEMOC and POLITY on Inequality, 1970-2007.
FE-IV
INFLAT (1) (2) (3) (4)
GOV .005 (.18) .004 (.20) .004 (.15) .004 (.19)
DEMOC -1.29 (-5.06) -.396 (-1.73)
POLITY -.245 (-5.11) -.075 (-1.75)
OPEN -.043 (-3.44) -.026 (-2.72) -.044 (-3.51) -.027 (-2.74)
GROWTH -.064 (-4.60) -.049 (-4.52) -.064 (-4.60) -.049 (-4.52)
M2 -.017 (-2.44) .001 (.29) -.017 (-2.46) .001 (.28)
INFLAT(-1) .581 (9.32) .580 (9.28)
Constant 3.02 (3.89) 1.22 (1.94) 2.40 (3.20) 1.04 (1.74)
F test* 3.02 1.68 3.27 1.70
Wald test 238.40 507.26 239.18 507.15
R2 .39 .63 .39 .63
T-ratios in parentheses, number of observations: NT = 148. The basic esti-
mated equation is: INFLATit = ￿i + ￿POLITYit + ￿GOVit + ￿OPENit +
￿GROWTHit+￿M2it+"INFLATit￿1+￿it; in which INFLAT is the in￿ ation
rates, DEMOC and POLITY are the political regime variables, GOV is the govern-
ment￿ s share in the real GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, GROWTH
is the growth rates of the real GDP, and M2 is a measure of ￿nancial development. The
identifying instrument is the ￿rst lag of the political regime variable being estimated.
FE-IV is the Fixed-E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables estimator.
In addition, it is worth mentioning that in most of these static and dy-
namic equations, GOV does not present clear-cut estimates nor statistical
signi￿cance, which suggests the importance of political regime characteris-
tics, or democracy in this case, as the main determinant of in￿ ation in the
region at the time.
13Finally, when we disaggregate the analysis further and make use of the
SUR estimator that takes into account any between-country dependence
present in the data, the story the data are telling does not change much. In
the ￿rst panel of Table Six the DEMOC variable presents negative signs
and all estimates are statistically signi￿cant. Furthermore, the three con-
trol variables present, most of the time, the expected signs (i.e. OPEN,
GROWTH and M2 keep their negative e⁄ects, and most of the estimates
are statistically signi￿cant). The GOV estimates are mostly positive and sig-
ni￿cant. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of independence suggests that
we can not accept the null hypothesis of between-countries [in]dependence.
When we use POLITY as the proxy for political regime characteristics
in the second panel of Table Five, all estimates present the by now expected
negative e⁄ects on in￿ ation, and all estimates are also statistically signif-
icant. Moreover, most controls present the expected signs and are mostly
statistically signi￿cant. The LM test indicates that we can not accept the
null of between-countries independence, which also justi￿es the use of the
SUR estimator in this instance.
It is also worth mentioning that Argentina presents the smallest political
estimates amongst all countries, and this is probably because Argentina
is the least unequal country in the sample. On the other hand, Brazil,
perhaps for being the most unequal country amongst the four, presents the
largest political regime estimates of all. This perhaps illustrates the fact
that democratisation in unequal countries indeed leads to higher in￿ ation
and macroeconomic instability, (i.e. Desai, et al. (2003)).
14Table 6: SUR Estimates of DEMOC and POLITY on In￿ ation, 1970-2007
SUR
INFLAT ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL PERU
GOV .116 (3.83) .204 (2.22) .332 (4.22) -.292 (-4.35)
DEMOC -.591 (-2.31) -1.06 (-3.15) -2.06 (-4.98) -1.08 (-4.76)
OPEN .038 (2.50) .035 (1.50) -.238 (-9.91) -.054 (-2.79)
GROWTH -.035 (-2.27) -.082 (-1.73) -.026 (-1.35) -.064 (-5.32)
M2 -.097 (-6.15) -.032 (-3.12) .057 (5.31) -.051 (-2.89)
LM test 14.26
GOV .118 (3.94) .205 (2.22) .324 (4.08) -.290 (-4.37)
POLITY -.108 (-2.24) -.208 (-3.12) -.349 (-5.03) -.212 (-4.83)
OPEN .040 (2.61) .034 (1.44) -.236 (-9.85) -.054 (-2.80)
GROWTH -.034 (-2.25) -.077 (-1.60) -.032 (-1.70) -.064 (-5.41)
M2 -.098 (-6.20) -.032 (-3.06) .056 (5.22) -.053 (-3.05)
LM test 15.02
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 148: The basic estimated
equation is INFLATt = ￿t+￿POLITYt+￿GOVt+￿OPENt+￿GROWTHt+
￿M2t +￿t; in which INFLAT is the in￿ ation rates, DEMOC and POLITY are
the political regime variables, GOV is the government￿ s share in the real GDP, OPEN
is a measure of economic openness, GROWTH is the growth rates of the real GDP, and
M2 is a measure of ￿nancial development. SUR is the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
estimator.
All in all, the estimates reported above indicate that the process of re-
democratisation of the Latin American countries in this sample was followed
by high rates of in￿ ation, and even bursts of hyperin￿ ation. Loosely speak-
ing, the introduction of more democratic political institutions seen at the
time was somewhat detrimental to macroeconomic stability, at least in terms
of in￿ ation rates. Alternatively, it can be said that unequal societies that
implement more democratic institutions must make sure that the executive,
even when democratically elected, is well constrained, and also introduce
sound economic institutions such as a responsible ￿scal authority and an
independent central bank, so that hyperin￿ ation does not occur in the ￿rst
place and stabilisations, when needed, are not delayed. This is particularly
important for these Latin American countries, since central bank indepen-
dence and ￿scal responsibility rules were implemented well after democrati-
15sation, i.e. only in the late 1990s.
3 Concluding Remarks
We investigated in this paper the role of more democratic regimes in in￿ ation
in a panel of Latin American countries that re-democratised in the 1980s.
The results, based on the relatively novel panel time-series analysis, suggest
that those countries su⁄ered from high rates of in￿ ation and even bursts of
hyperin￿ ation right after they re-democratised. Moreover, macroeconomic
stabilisations came only after a long and protracted delay. All in all, the
populist view of in￿ ation, which predicts that newly elected coalitions coming
into power in unequal societies end up generating higher de￿cits and, in turn,
higher in￿ ation, is con￿rmed by the data and analysis conducted here.
The current relevance of carrying out a historical study on the Latin
American hyperin￿ ationary experience is that, as we speak, an emerging
country like Zimbabwe is su⁄ering from hyperin￿ ation. On the one hand,
it can be speculated that the Zimbabwean hyperin￿ ation which started in
1999, coincides with the fact that the constraints on the governing party
were severely relaxed (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Querub￿n (2008)). On
the other hand, the present analysis can also be inversely related to the South
African case, an unequal society indeed, but with a rather strong constitu-
tion which constrains the executive, and without much political competition
or opposition to the governing party since the democratisation of 1994. In
this respect, it can be speculated that the South African government, which
has never bowed to populist demands for [re]distribution coming from a
weak opposition, has been quite e¢ cient in managing the economy. All the
same, the two cases above are illustrative of the fact that developing coun-
tries with di⁄erent characteristics will not necessarily follow the pattern of
Latin America.
Furthermore, the quality of the evidence presented is, to a certain ex-
tent, boosted not only because we focus on those rather unequal countries
which re-democratised and su⁄ered from hyperin￿ ation in Latin America,
but also because we use a novel proxy for political regime characteristics
based on principal components analysis, which is believed to be a step for-
ward since it reduces model uncertainty and has more explanatory power.
Moreover, we take advantage of the novel panel time-series analysis, which
16deals with important empirical issues not covered by the previous studies,
such as heterogeneity bias in dynamic panels, economic endogeneity and
between-country dependence. It is therefore believed that the analysis con-
ducted here represents a step forward in terms of achieving better and more
insightful estimates.
Regarding future work, on the one hand, the inclusion of economic in-
equality would be a welcome development to this analysis. However data
on inequality from Peru and Bolivia are fragmented, which somehow pre-
cludes a study on the impact of political regime characteristics and inequal-
ity on in￿ ation. More realistically, the use of an alternative proxy for ￿ po-
litical consolidation￿(e.g. the number of political parties in congress since
re-democratisation) would be a feasible alternative to Polity IV variables.
Moreover, with extended time series and information on central bank inde-
pendence we could interact ￿ political consolidation￿with central bank inde-
pendence to get a proxy for political and economic maturity which would
bring more explanatory power to this analysis.
On the other hand, the Zimbabwean case is certainly worth investigat-
ing. The impact of the reduction on the constraints on the executive and
the hyperin￿ ationary episode that followed since 1999 should be further
analysed. Moreover, the current South African context is of some interest
too, since a new political party with some opposition power has been recently
created, and can demand from the newly elected government some sort of
[re]distribution. All in all, the analysis of political regime characteristics
and economic institutions can be extended to di⁄erent cases.
Finally, a comparison of the Latin American case with the Eastern Eu-
ropean transition economies would also be of some interest. Some of those
countries su⁄ered from high rates of in￿ ation during the transition from so-
cialism, however those economies were not as unequal as the Latin American
ones.
To conclude, the Latin American hyperin￿ ationary experience is infor-
mative because it exempli￿es an interesting pattern seen in the region at
the time. Unequal societies that re-democratise and which still do not have
the ￿ right political context￿or enough political maturity, nor the right eco-
nomic institutions such as an independent central bank conducting sound
monetary policy and a credible ￿scal authority in place, will end up doing
more harm than good in terms of macroeconomic [in]stability, which a⁄ects
17mainly the welfare of the poor. Moreover, those Latin American countries
took, roughly speaking, ten years to stabilise, which is also an example of
a delayed stabilisation. Macroeconomic stabilisation came only when those
countries matured their political regimes, and also when they introduced
central bank independence, in￿ ation targeting and ￿scal responsibility laws
in the 1990s10. All in all, political liberalisation should be accompanied by
some sort of ￿ political consolidation￿and also by the implementation of the
right economic institutions.
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